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Abstract
At the heart of most computer systems is a file system. The file system contains user data,
executable programs, configuration and authorization information, and (usually) the base exe-
cutable version of the operating system itself. The ability to monitor file systems for unautho-
rized or unexpected changes gives system administrators valuable data for protecting and main-
taining their systems. However, in environments of many networked heterogeneous platforms
with different policies and software, the task of monitoring changes becomes quite daunting.
Tripwire is tool that aids UNIXl system administrators and users in monitoring a designated
set of files and directories for any changes. Used with system files on a regular (e.g., daily) basis,
Tripwire can notify system administrators of corrupted or altered files, so corrective actions may
be taken in a timely manner. Tripwire may also be used on user or group files or databases to
signal changes.
This paper describes the design and implementation of the Tripwire tool. It uses inter-
changeable "signature" routines to identify changes in files, and is highly configurable. Tripwire
is no-cost software, available on the Internet, and is currently in use on thousands of machines
around the world.
1 Introduction
Most modern computer systems incorporate some form of long-term storage, usually in the form
of files stored in a :file system. These files typically contain all of the long-lived data in the system,
including both user data and applications, and system executables and databases. As such, the
lUNIX is a trademark or Novell. This week.
1
file system is one of the usual targets of an attack. Motives for altering system files are many.
Intruders could modify system databases and programs to allow future entry. System logs could be
removed to cover their tracks or discourage future detection. Compromised security could lead to
degradation or denial of services. Modification or destruction of user files might also compromise
aspects of the security policy. As such, the security administrator needs to closely monitor the
integrity of the file system contents.
The near· ubiquitous UNIX system is an example of a file system where such monitoring is
useful. Flaws and weaknesses in typical UNIX systems are well-documented (e.g., [8, 22, 17, 4, 9]).
UNIX file systems are susceptible to threats in the guise of unauthorized users, intruders, viruses,
worms, and logic bombs as well as failures and bugs. As such, UNIX system administrators are
faced with prospects of subtle, difficult-to-detect damage to files, malicious and accidental.
Tripwire is an integrity checking tool designed for the UNIX environment to aid system ad·
ministrators to monitor their file systems for unauthorized modifications. First made available
on November 2, 1992, it has proven to be a popular tool, being portable, configurable, scalable,
flexible, manageable, automatable, and secure. It was written in response to repeated break-in
activity on the Internet, and the difficulty experienced by affected administrators in finding all of
the "backdoors" left by the intruders.
The foundations of integrity checking programs are surveyed in [2J. In simplest terms, a database
is created with some unique identifier for each file to be monitored. By recreating that identifier
(which could be a copy of the entire file contents) and comparing it against the saved version, it is
possible to determine if a file has been altered. Furthermore, by comparing entries in the database,
it is possible to determine if files have been added or deleted from the system.
As described in [9], a checklist is one form of this database for a UNIX system. The file contents
themselves are not usually saved as this would require too much disk space. Instead, a checklist
would contain a set of values generated from the original file - usually including the length, time
of last modification, and owner. The checklist is periodically regenerated and compared against
the saved copies, with discrepancies noted. However, as noted in [9], changes may be made to the
contents of UNIX files without any of these values changing from the stored values; in particular,
a user gaining access to the root account may modify the raw disk to alter the saved data without
it showing in the checklist.
Efficiently detecting changes to files under these circumstances can be done by storing a value
calculated from the contents of the files being monitored. If this value is dependent on the entire
contents of the file and is difficult to match for an arbitrary change to the file, then storing this value
is sufficient. This fingerprint or signature of the file can then be saved instead of the file contents.2
The signature function(s) used should be computationally simple to perform, but infeasible to
reverse. It should signal if the file changes but be sufficiently large as to make a change collision
unlikely. Signature functions and methods are discussed in [21, 16,9, 15,4, 7, 14].
2Some contend that the term ~iglla!tJreshould be used only when referring to functions that have roots in crypto-
graphic methods. In this paper, we use the term in a more general connotation: the fixed-si:l\e "fingerprint" generated
by a function using the contents of a file as its input data.
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Although various candidate signature functions have been studied over the past few years, we
were unaware of any tool in general use that used these methods under UNIX. This led to the
design of Tripwire.
2 Problem Definition
Ultimately, the goal of integrity checking tools is to detect and notify system administrators of
changed, added, or deleted files in some meaningful and useful manner. The success of such a tool
depends on how we11it works within the realities of the administration environment. This includes
appropriate flexibility to fit a range of security policies, portability to different platforms in the
same administrative realm, and ease of use. We also believe that it is important that any such tool
present minimal threat to the system on which it was used; if the tool were to be read or executed
by an attacker, it should not allow the system to be compromlsed.
From this basic view, we identified several classes of issues for further study.
2.1 Administration issues
It is not uncommon for system administrators to have sites consisting of hundreds of networked
machines. These machines may consist of different hardware platforms, operating systems, releases
of software, and configurations of disks and peripherals. Some machines are critical because of
their specialized functions, such as mail and file services. These variables increase the complexity
of administration.
Furthermore, system administrators manage these machines within the confines of local policies,
dictating backups, user accounts, access, and security. Even small sites may have different policies
for machines based on their roles.
To administer these machines, configurations may be classified into logical classes based on their
purpose (e.g., desktop machines, file servers). This maximlzes potential configuration reuse and
reduces opportunities for error.
A well-designed tool must work within these conditions. It must be scalable to networks consist-
ing of hundreds of machines. The tool must be flexible to handle different and unique configurations,
at some cost to complexity. However, appropriate support for reuse helps to reduce complexity and
exploit existing commonality of logical classes of machines. Thus, an integrity tool should be both
able to handle many special-case configurations and to support reuse of configuration information
based on common characteristics.
2.2 Reporting issues
To aid in the detection of the appropriate threats, system administrators would use an integrity
checker to monitor file systems for added, deleted, and changed files. Meaningfully reporting
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changed files is difficult, because most files are expected to change: system log files are written
to, program sources are updated, and documents are revised. Typically, these changes would not
concern system admlnistrators. However, changes to certain files, such as system binaries, mlght
elicit a different reaction.
Similarly, changes to certain file attributes (stored in the file's inode structure [1]) occur fre-
quently and are usually benign. A tool reporting every changed file potentially forces security
admlnistrators to interpret large amounts of data. Interpreting needlessly large reports cluttered
with unimportant information increases the risk of genuinely interesting and noteworthy reports
being lost or missed.3
For example, consider the tedium imposed by a scheme that requires system admlnistrators to
search for reports of potentially dangerous file ownership changes, obscured by reports of thousands
of files whose access timestamp changed. However, in some of those cases, changes to a file's access
timestamp may be of great interest. For instance, "trap files" could be placed as tripwires against
snooping intruders.4 If the system is properly configured, security admlnistrators could learn when
an intruder or local "snooping" user has accessed the trapped file, thus unavoidably updating the
file's timestamp.
Supplying some form of global filter to the output of the monitor program mlght help reduce
the reports to a more manageable volume. There are difficulties with this approach, however. It
may not be possible to write general rules that remove noise while adequately preserving interesting
events. Global filter rules may prevent system administrators from carrying out local, and possibly
very unusual, policies. We believe it is better to generate only those events of interest rather than
filter meaningful events from a collection of all possible events.
2.3 Database issues
The database used by the integrity checker should be protected from unauthorized modifications; an
intruder who can change the database can subvert the entire integrity checking scheme. Although
the system admlnistrator can secure the database by storing it on some media inaccessible to
remote intruders (e.g., paper printout), usability is sacrificed. A database stored in some machine
readable format may risk unauthorized modification, but allows the integ~ity checking process to be
automated. Storing the database on read-only media provides the best of both approaches, allowing
machine access but preventing changes. This also will allow users to use the tool to monitor their
own files, if they wish.
After a reported file addition, deletion, or change is determined to be benign, the database
should be updated to reflect the change. This prevents the change from appearing in future reports.
Furthermore, comparisons for changed files should be made with up-to-date information. Updating
a database stored on read-only media poses obvious procedural difficulties. The integrity checking
protocol must allow some mechanism or procedure for the secure installation of updated databases.
3This is quite similar to the problem of audit trail reduction.
~Hence the original motivation for the name "Tripwire."
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Because files systems are dynamic in nature, their associated databases may require updating
often. Therefore, updating specific entries should not require regenerating the entire database. As
many files may change, enumerating each file to be updated could be tedious. Tedium should be
avoided to encourage and support use of the tool.
The database should contain no information that allows an intruder to compromise the integrity
checking scheme. T.h.is allows databases to be shipped with software distribution packages, whose
circulation can not be easily restricted.
2.4 File signature issues
Selection of appropriate signatures to use in an integrity checking tool should help engender trust
in the tool. Thus, it is important to address issues related to the selection of one or more functions
to generate the file signatures.
2.4.1 Change detection
A simple method for detecting a changed file is comparing it against a previously made copy. This
has the advantage of giving system administrators the ability to tell exactly what change was made
to the file. However, this method is resource and time intensive, potentially doubling the space
used by the file system and necessitating further support from system administration staff. In many
cases, knowing that a change has been made is all that is necessary.
A more efficient method would record the file's fixed-size signature in the database. One conse-
quence of fixed-sized signatures is multiple mappings: for any given signature generated by a file,
there are many (possibly infinite) other files of varying sizes that also generate that same signature.
What is important here is that the functions be chosen such that it is .h.ighly unlikely that an
attacker could alter a file in such a way that it coincidentally retains its original signatures.
2.4.2 Signature spoofing
Intruders could modify a file and remain undetected in an integrity checking scheme using file
signatures if the file can be further modified to generate the same signature as the original. Two
methods for finding such a modification are brute force search, and inverting then spoofing the
signature function.
Given a modified file, someone using a brute force search would iteratively scan for an offsetting
change in the file that yields the desired signature. For a signature of size n bits, on average, one
might expect to perform 2n- 1 attempts to find such a signature collision.
For small files, this search is a trivial operation using high-speed, general-purpose workstations.
Consider the case of finding a duplicate signature for the Ibinllogin program under SunDS 4.1.
This is a 47 kilobyte binary file. Using a SparcStation 1+ (a common 12.5 MIPS machine), a
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I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 >9
Total
16-bit checksum (sum) 14177 6647 2437 800 235 62 12 2 I 24375
16·bit CRC 15022 6769 2387 677 164 33 5 0 0 25059
32-bit CRC 3 I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
64-bit DES-CBC I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
128-bit MD4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
128-bit MD5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
128-bit Snefru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Collision frequencies of signatures gathered from file systems at Purdue University and
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
duplicate 16-bit eRe (Cyclic Redundancy Checkcode) signature preserving the file's length can be
found in 0.42 seconds. A duplicate 32-bit eRe signature can be found in four hours.
However, exhaustive search becomes unnecessary if one exploits knowledge of the workings of
the signature function itself. By understanding how a function generates a signature, one could
reverse-engineer the function. For any desired signature, an intruder could reverse the signature
function and generate an arbitrary file that also yields that signature[14J.
For these reasons, message-digest algorithms (also known as one-way hash functions, finger-
printing routines, or manipulation detection codes) as described in [7, 15, 14] become valuable as
integrity checking tools. Message-digests are usually large, often at least 128 bits, and computa-
tionally infeasible to reverse.
2.4.3 Empirical results
Table 1 shows signature collision frequencies for 254,686 files. These signatures were gathered
from file systems residing on five computers at Purdue University and two computers at Sun Mi-
crosystems, Inc. These files were in active user directories and source trees, and are a representative
sampling of files residing on large, timeshared, general purpose servers and large file servers used
as source repositories.
Each file examined had its signatures generated using (in order) the 16-bit SunDS sum command,
two standard eRe algorithms, the final 64 bits from a DES-CBC[6] encoded version of the file, and
the 128-bit values taken from standard message digest functions. The large number of collisions for
the 16-bit signatures, and the absence of any collisions for the 128-bit signatures, helps to confirm
our belief that larger signatures are unlikely to collide by accident.
We also generated empirical support of the difficulty of spoofing 128-bit signatures. An attempt
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was made to find a duplicate Snefru[14] signature for the !bin/login program using 130 Sun
workstations. 5 Over a time of several weeks, 17 million signatures were generated and compared
with ten thousand stored signatures, the maximum number of signatures that fit in memory without
forcing virtual memory page faults on each search iteration. Approximately 224 signatures were
searched without finding any collisions, leaving approximately 1015 remaining unsearched.
2.5 Performance and resource issues
Detecting file tampering by comparing each file against a duplicate copy is easy to do, but requires
considerable storage and time. Generating and comparing file signatures may require more com-
putation, but it requires less storage. Some signature functions are quite expensive to execute in
software, while others are simpler. Local policy should dictate the signatures and resources used
to satisfy the level of trust desired.
2.6 Other issues
Security tools should be completely self-contained, needing no auxiliary programs to run. For
example, an integrity checker that depends on utilities such as diff or sum could be subverted if
either of those programs were compromised. Thus, by making this tool self-contained, it would be
possible to run the program without relying on outside, potentially vulnerable, helper programs.
The database for the tool should be human-readable. This not only provides an alternate means
of checking the database for potential tampering (e.g., comparison against a printed copy), but it
also provides a means for users to verify individual files. By including a standalone program to
apply the signature functions to an arbitrary file, a user could compare this against the signature
database.
The program should be able to run without privilege, possibly on a user's private set of files.
Additionally, it should only report, and not effect, changes. Although a user could use the tool's
output to drive changes, the tool itself would not provide any explicit means of making alterations
to the system. This was also one of the principles at the heart of the COPS tool,[8] and one which
we believe contributed greatly to its wide-spread acceptance and use.
3 Existing Tools
!>We measured a Sun SparcStation 1 as capable of generating 37 Snefru signatures per second
sSPI, a widely-used tool developed by the U. S. Department of Energy and the U. S. Air Force, is not discussed
in this paper; future releases of SPI are to be based on the COPS tool.
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mentioned here. While many of these tools may be outstanding in their own right, most are
mismatches for integrity checking in UNIX environments.
3.1 COPS
COPS serves as a good benchmark for static audit tools. Freely distributed since 1989, it is
widely used and supports a large number of UNIX platforms. It is comprehensive, configurable,
and thorough. However, as a static audit tool, it does not aid in intrusion detection other than
identifying known avenues of penetration.
The lack of integrity monitoring in eops was addressed after its release by the addition of the
crc_check program. It is a "checklisting" program, similar to the shell scripts described in [9, 4]. It
is based on a simple eRe checksum of the files being monitored. Numerous problems prevent it
from being a comprehensive integrity checking solution as we have outlined in the previous sections.
Most obvious is the lack of extensibility and flexibility in crecheck. It is impossible to update
a database entry without regenerating the entire database. Experience has shown that a more
sophisticated program is necessary to be useful. For larger sites, maintaining crecheck is especially
tedious.
crecheck does not allow all the fields in the UNIX :file inode structure to be monitored. This
prevents certain changes from being monitored. Furthermore, the reporting cannot be tailored
within crecheck. Although filter programs can be written to transform the output, relying on
outside programs that can be subverted introduces another point of compromise.
The use of eRe signatures are poorly suited for integrity checking. Originally intended for
hardware-based error-detection, eRe functions were designed to detect multiple bit errors in a data
stream (e.g., [3)). Reversing the eRe function to yield a desired signature is a well-understood
process, and tools to assist a potential intruder are widely available[10J.
3.2 TAMU
TAMU is a set of security utilities being distributed by Texas A&M University.[20] Included in
the package is a static audit tool, a signature database to check system binaries against known
signatures of patch files, and a sophisticated network traffic analyzer that aids system administrators
in assessing outside threats.
TAMU is shipped with a database of signatures for system binaries of popular operating systems.
TAMU compares signatures of critical system files against those stored in its database to determine
whether they match any of the known versions. TAMU can thus notify the security administrators
of binaries with security patches that have not been installed by the operating system vendor as
determined by records in its signature database.
TAMU is more specialized than most integrity checkers, but requires that its database be up-
dated as new operating system versions and patches are released. Although this tool provides
8
valuable information to system administrators, it is not a general-purpose integrity checker: it
provides no facilities to scan the entire file system for changes.
3.3 Hobgoblin
Hobgoblin was written as tool to aid system administrators in enforcing local file system policies.[13]
For instance, when more than one person is allowed to install and delete files, it becomes difficult
to track changes. Hobgoblin can assist in tracking these changes.
Hobgoblin uses a template description that specified files and directories are expected to match.
It then scans those ftles to check whether the files match the descriptions. In this manner, any
changes can be reported to the system administrator.
Hobgoblin does not have all the capabilities associated with integrity checkers: detecting added
and deleted files is not straightforward in Hobgoblin. There is no existing interface for storing a
file's signature in the database. Furthermore, Hobgoblin assumes that files in its database do not
change often. Because of this, no provisions for updating the database exist. This makes its use in
dynamic me systems difficult.
3.4 ATP
A recent paper describes a forthcoming program for UNIX, named ATP.[25] It employs a dual
signature to verify files, using a 32-bit CRC and the MD5 message digest algorithm. The ATP
database is encrypted using DES in Cipher Block Chaining mode, and is checksummed to detect
tampering and prevent unauthorized updates. However, this prevents its use in an automated
manner: the secure entry of the encryption key requires human intervention or else storage in the
file system - thus compromising the entire program. The lack of any mechanisms for updating
the database potentially makes maintenance as tedious as ere-check.
An interesting design decision was introduction of action lists. Having detected a changed file,
ATP can automatically change the ownership to root and make it inaccessible to all users. This
feature makes ATP unique among the security tools listed in this section, because it does more
than report potential dangers. Provided that the actions are suitable under local policies, this
automated form of damage control could be very useful to system administrators. However, as
we noted earlier, this is of questionable utility. Accidental triggering of the rules and malformed
actions are two dangers in such a mechanism. Furthermore, a determined attacker might well be
able to exploit this mechanism to perform denial-of-service attacks.
4 Implementation of Tripwire
Tripwire was written over a period of two months in 1992. It was released in the fall of 1992 to
a group of over one hundred beta testers around the world who provided valuable feedback on its
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portability and features. Several bugs have been identified, and four updates were released in 1993.
In December 1993, the formal release of Tripwire was made.
This section describes the structure of Tripwire. A high level model of Tripwire operation is
shown in Figure 1. This shows how Tripwire uses two inputs: a configuration describing file system
objects to monitor, and a database of previously-generated signatures putatively matching the
configuration. Selection-masks (described below) specify file system attributes and signatures to









I FlIes residing on system I
I J
F1gure 1: Diagram of high level operation model of Tripwire
4.1 Administrative model
4.1.1 Portability
Because of the heterogeneous nature of computer equipment at most sites, the design of Tripwire
emphasized program and database portability. The code 1s written in the standard K&R C pro-
gramming language,[12] adhering to POSIX standards wherever possible. The result is a program
that compiles and runs on at least 28 BSD and System-V variants of UNIX, including Xenix and
Unicos.
Tripwire database files are encoded in standard ASCII and are mostly human readable. They
are completely interoperable (i.e., files generated on one platform can be read and used on other
platforms). This allows the database files to be printed using standard software, compared us1ng
standard text tools, and examined using other standard tools.
Generating correct signatures 1s complicated by architectural differences in byte-ordering (l.e.,
big-endian vs. little endian). An automated installation procedure generates macros and header
files so that the signatures generated are uniform; the standard "network-order" byte order used in
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the IP protocol suite is our underlying model. This allows database files to be used on machines
different from those on which they are generated, if this should be desired (and as might be the
case with some networked file systems and software distributions).
A comprehensive test suite is included in the Tripwire distribution to confirm correct signature
generation. The test suite also checks each file in the distribution against those stored in a database,
ascertaining each file's integrity. This serves both to check the consistency of the distribution, and
to ensure that all features of the Tripwire program are working as expected.
4.1.2 Scalability
Tripwire includes an M4·like preprocessing language [11] to help system administrators maximize
reuse of configuratiou files. By including directives such as "llllllinclude", "lDlDifdef" , "I'!II'Oifhost",
and "<OlDdefine", system administrators can write a core configuration file describing portions of
the file system shared by many machines. These core files can then be conditionally included in
the configuration file for each machine.
To allow the possible use of Tripwire at sites consisting of thousands of machines, configuration
and database mes do not need to reside on the actual machine. Input can be read from file
descriptors, open at the time of Tripwire invocation. These file descriptors can be connected to
UNIX pipes or network connections. Thus, a remote server or a local program can supply the
necessary file contents. Supporting UNIX style pipes also allows for outside programs to supply
encryption and compression services - services that we do not anticipate including as a standard
part of the core Tripwire package.
Tripwire does not encrypt the database file so as to ensure that runs can be completely auto-
mated (i.e., no one has to type in the encryption key every night at 3 a.m.). Because the database
contains nothing that would aid an intruder in subverting Tripwire, this does not undermine the
security of the system. However, if Tripwire is used in an environment where the database is
encrypted as a matter of policy, the interface supports this, as described above.
4.1.3 Configurability and flexibility
Tripwire makes a distinction between the configuration file and the database file. Each machine
may share a configuration file, bnt each generates its own database file. Thus, identically configured
machines can share thelr configuration database, but each has its integrity checked against a per-
machine database.
Because of the preprocessor support, system admlnistrators can write Tripwire configuration
mes that support numerous configurations of machines. Uniform and unique machines are similarly
handled. This helps support reuse and mlnimize user overhead in installation.
The configuration file for Tripwire, tv. config, contains a list of entries, enumerating the
set of directory (or files) to be monitored for changes, additions, or deletions. Associated with each
entry is a selection·mask (described in the next section) that describes which file (inode) attributes
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can change without being reported as an exception. An excerpt from a set of tliJ. config entries is
shown in Figure 2.
careful# you can't be too
# dynamic files







letc R # all files under letc
Q~ifhost solaria.cs.purdue.edu







Figure 2: An excerpt from a tliJ. config file
Prefixes to the til. config entries allow for pruning (i.e., preventing Tripwire from recursing into
the specified directory or recording a database entry for a file). Both inclusive and non~inclusive
pruning are supportedj that is, a directory's contents only may be excluded from monitoring, or
the directory and its contents may both be excluded.
By default, all entries within a named directory are included when the database is generated.
Each entry is recorded in the database with the same flags and signatures as the enclosing, specified
directory. This allows the user to write more compact and inclusive configuration files. Some users
have reported using configuration files of a simple I, naming all entries in the file system!
4.2 Reporting model
The tliJ. config file contains the names of files and directories with their associated selection-mask.
A selection-mask may look like: +pinugsm12-a. Flags are added ("+") or deleted ("-") from the
set of items to be examined.
Tripwire reads this as, "Report changes in permission and modes, inode number, number of
links, user id, group id, size of the file, modification timestamp, and signatures 1 and 2. Disregard
changes to access timestamp."
A flag exists for every distinct field stored in an inode. Provided is a set of templates to allow
system administrators to quickly classify files into categories that use common sets of flags:
read-only files Only the access timestamp is ignored.


















changed: -rw-r--r-- root 20 Sep 17 13:46:43 1993 I.rhosts
### Attr Observed (what it is) Expected (what it should be)




Figure 3: Sample Tripwire output for a changed file
growing log :files Changes to the access and modification timestamp, and signatures are
ignored. Increasing file sizes are ignored.
ignore nothing self-explanatory
ignore everything self-explanatory
Any files differing from their database entries are then interpreted accordlng to their selection-
masks. If any attributes are to be monitored, the mename is printed, as are the expected and
actual values of the inode attributes. An example of Tripwire output for changed files is shown in
Figure 3.
A "quiet option" is also available through a command-line option to force Tripwire to give terse
output. The output when running in this mode is suitable for use by filter programs. This allows
for automated actions, similar to those allowed in ATP if it is really desired. One example would be
to use the terse output of Tripwire after a breakln to quickly make a backup tape of only changed
files, to be examined later.
By allowing reporting to be dictated by local policy, Tripwire can be used at sites with a very
broad range of security policies.
4.3 Database model
Tripwire uses two databases: the configuration file and the output database. The design and
intended use of both of these mes is described in this section.
4.3.1 Inviolability
Tripwire uses an unencrypted database that can be world-readable. To prevent the database from
being altered, it should be stored on some tamper-proof media. One method of accomplishing this
involves storing the databases on a write-protected disk or on a "secure server" where logins can be
strictly controlled. The database could also be made available via a read-only remote file system
(e.g., read-only NFS [23]).
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Installing an updated database is problematic because intruders m1ght replace the database (or
selected entries) with one of their own choosing during the update. Therefore, to best ensure the
security of the database, the Tripwire documentation suggests that the machine be operated in
single-user mode to install the database. System adm1nistrators can thus choose greater security
over ease-of-use, allowing for the possible enforcement of even the most severe policies.
4.3.2 Semantics
Changes to the database can be categorized into six cases, as shown in Table 2. For each of
these cases, an appropriate action is taken, based on whether the file is a tw. config entry, and
whether the file exists in the old and newly generated databases.
Updating or deleting a file from the database is straightfoward - the database entry for the
file is replaced by a new entry reflecting the current state of the file. Adding files is more complex
as there is no associated selection-mask for the file (i.e., there is no tlil'.config entry for it). To
resolve this, Tripwire scans the list of tw. config entries and chooses the "closest" ancestor entry,
whose selection-mask it inherits. If no such entry can be found, the file is added with a default
selection-mask.
Adding, deleting, and updating entries is also simple. All the files in the database that were
generated from the given entry are also added, deleted, or updated, appropriately. The updates
are done to a copy of the file in case of some system failure. The user must then replace the old
database with the modified version.
4.3.3 Interface
Specifying files to be updated can be done via the command-line. Tripwire also has an interactive
update mode where the user is asked whether the database entry should be changed for each
changed, added, or deleted file. This allows the system administrator to easily update the database,
and ensures that no files are inadvertently updated without review. Updating the database is a
Filename exists in:




x x Updated file
x Added entry
x x Deleted entry
x x x Updated entry
Table 2: Enumeration of possible Tripwire update states.
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process that should not be overly automated because its careful review is as important as reports
of changed files.
4.4 Signatures model
Tripwire has a generic interface to signature routines and supports up to ten signatures to be
used for each file. The following routines are included in the latest Tripwire distribution: MD5[19J
(the RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm), MD4[18] (the RSA Data Security,
Inc. MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm), MD2 (the RSA Data Security, Inc. MD2 Message·Digest
Algorithm),7 Snefru[14] (the Xerox Secure Hash Function), and SHA (the NIST proposed Secure
Hash Algorithm). Tripwire also includes POSIX 1003.2 compliant CRC-32 and CCITT compliant
CRC-16 signatures.
Each signature may be included in the selection-mask by including its index. Because each
signature routine presents a different balance in the equation between performance and security,
the system administrator can tailor the use of signatures according to local policy. By default,
MD5 and Snefru sigantures are recorded and checked for each file. However, different signatures
can he specified for each and every file. This allows the system administrator great flexibility in
what to scan, and when.
Also included in the Tripwire distribution is siggen, a program that generates signatures for
the files specified on the command line. This tool provides a convenient means of generating any
of the included signatures for any file.
The code for the signature generation functions is written with a very simple interface. Thus,
Tripwire can be customized to use additional signature routines, including cryptographic checksum
methods and per-site hash-code methods. Tripwire has room for 10 functions, and only seven are
preassigned, as above.
4.5 Performance
Tripwire allows local policy to dictate which signatures are compared against the database. Which
signatures to be used can be specified at run-time, as well as in the tv. confis, allowing flexible
policies to be used without modifying configuration files. For example, Tripwire could compare
CRC32 signatures hourly, and compare MD5 and Snefru signatures daily, needing only two cron
entries with the appropriate command line arguments to Tripwire.
TThe copyright on the available code for MD-2 strictly limits its use to privacy-enhanced mail functions. RSA Data




This section summarizes the procedure of buildlng, installing, and using Tripwire on a single ma-
chine. This procedure assumes a system administrator who is interested in the maximum level of
assurance possible using Tripwire.
5.1 Building Tripwire
First, the administrator would load a clean distribution of the operating system and utilities onto an
isolated machine (disconnected from any network, and funning in single-user mode). After unpack-
ing the Tripwire distribution, the administrator edits the top level Makefile[24] to specify system-
specific tools (e.g., compiler, compiler flags, etc.). Next, the user would choose a conf-machine.h
header file that describes special options for the machine to be monitored. Currently, 23 machine-
specific header files are included; writing a customized header file for a machine not included in
this group is a simple procedure for someone with moderate programming skill, and we have been
encoUIaging the authors of such files to share them with us for use in later releill'ies.
After configuring Tripwire in this fill'ihion, system administrators type ''make'' to build the
Tripwire binaries. After these files are compiled, typing ''make test" starts the Tripwire test suite.
This test sulte exercises all the signature routines to enSUIe correct signature generation, and then
compares all the Tripwire source files against a test database to ensure distribution integrity.
5.2 Installing the database
After building Tripwire, the system administrator should build the system database. The file
tw. config contains a listing of all the directories and files to be scanned, along with their associ-
ated selection-masks. Generalized tv. config files are provided for eight common UNIX versions
(including generic BSD and SVR4). These files cover the most critical system files and binaries.
After choosing and reviewing this file, the administrator can make his own customizations
and additions. After all additions have been made, it is time to create the database. In single-
user mode still, so that no user can tamper with the files or system, the user types "tripvire
-initialize" and waits for Tripwire to finish scanning and recordlng information on the files
listed in the tv. config file.
When this is completed, Tripwire reports where the database has been stored, and reminds the
user to move the database to read-only media. After having done so, and copied the configuration
file and Tripwire binary itself to read-only, the system administrator has successfully installed the
database, and can bring the machine back up in multi-user mode.
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5.3 Checking the file systems
When running in integrity checking mode, Tripwire rereads the tw. config and the database files,
and then scans the file system to determine whether any files have added, deleted, or changed.
System administrators type "tripwire" to generate a report of these files. This must be done in
such a way as to ensure that the protected, original version of Tripwire is the one that is run.
Alternatively, typing "tripwire -interactive" will run Tripwire in interactive update mode.
rn this mode, Tripwire scans for added, deleted, or changed files, and for each such file, the user is
asked whether or not the entry should be updated. A new database is created, and again, a warning
notifies the user to install it on read-only media to ensure the security of the database. Note that
Tripwire does not overwrite the existing database. Further note that our system administrator
should perform this function in stand-alone mode to maximize protection of the database.
Tripwire is designed so that any user can safely execute it - the database file can be pub-
lic information, and the binaries require no special privileges to run. If local policy deems this
inappropriate, both the database and Tripwire binaries can be made readable and executable by
only system administrators. However, by disabling use of Tripwire by general users, they are like-
wise unable to run the program to monitor their own databases and applications which might not
otherwise be covered by the system-wide monitoring.
6 Experiences
Since the initial release, four versions have been released to incorporate bug fixes, support additional
platforms, and add new features. The authors estimate Tripwire is being actively used at several
thousand sites around the world. Retrievals of the Tripwire distribution from our FTP server
initially exceeded 300 per week. Currently, seven months after the last official patch release, we see
an average of 25 fetches per week. This does not include the copies being obtained from the many
FTP mirror sites around the net.
More data on active Tripwire usage can be gleaned from bug reports. The most recent patch to
Tripwire included code to check for certain rare and erroneous boundary conditions, displaying a
banner that asked the user to mail the output to the authors when found. Although the associated
bug is now fixed and a corrective patch distributed, the authors still receive about two of the
requested bug reports per day. From this information, we can only surmise that Tripwire use is
growing. (The error condition is only triggerd when very large databases exceeding 7000 entries
are used.)
Tripwire has proven to be higWy portable, successfully running on over 28 UNIX platforms.
Among them are Sun, SGI, HP, Sequents, Pyramids, Crays, NeXTs, Apple Macintosh, and even
Xenix. Configurations for new operating systems has proven to be sufficiently general to necessitate
the inclusion of only eight example tw. config files.
rn the past year, the authors have collected feedback from numerous active sites reporting
the effectiveness of Tripwire in detecting changed :files on their systems. Several cases have been
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reported to us of Tripwire finding unauthorized intruders. Other cases have been reported to us of
system administrators making unannounced file system updates or configuration changes. At least
one case of a bad disk being discovered by Tripwire has also been reported to us. All these classes
of stories seem to validate our concept of this integrity checking tool. The last two classes of use
have proven to be surprising applications of Tripwire that we did not envision at the time we wrote
it!
According to system administrators, the ability to update Tripwire databases is among its most
important features. Files seem to change for many unforeseen reasons. Consequently, the database
is updated regularly. The addition of the interactive update facility in Tripwire was among the
most enthusiastically received features.
System administrators who are concerned about their security seem to appreciate the informa-
tion provided by Tripwire. They further appreciate the lack of privilege necessary to run Tripwire,
and its passive, report-only mode of operation. To ensure its security and inviolability, "secure NFS
servers" are the most commonly used configurations for running Tripwire. However, some sites'
distrust of NFS has motivated the addition of a "Tripwire server" which provides network services
for fetching databases and configuration files.
Many users have found the Tripwire sources to be legible and malleable. Eleven user-contributed
scripts are included with the Tripwire distribution, and we know of several sites where the users
have extensively modified Tripwire to fit local needs. Maintenance of Tripwire has proven similarly
easy; adding the SHA signature routine to the distribution was accomplished in less than one hour.
The early bug reports often had file and line numbers of the faults. This surprising fact lends
support that the approximately 13,000 lines of C code is relatively easy to understand.
7 Conclusions
Tripwire has proven to be a highly portable tool that system administrators can build using available
tools. It is completely self-contained, and once built, requires no other tools for execution. Tripwire
is publically available, is widely distributed, and widely used.
Tripwire has been used by system administrators in large and small sites: we have documented
Tripwire's active use at single machine sites, as well as sites having several hundreds of machines.
We have yet to hear a report of a site where Tripwire was installed and then removed because it did
not function according to expectation, or because it was too difficult to build or maintain. Coupled
with the many positive comments we have received, and the fact that Tripwire has already caught
several intruders, leads us to conclude that our analysis and design are successful. We hope this
effort serves as a model for others who consider building security tools with similar goals.
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8 Availability
The beta version of Tripwire was made publically available and posted to camp. sources. UNIX
on November 2, 1992 after three months of extensive testing. Over three hundred users around
the world critiqued the four preliminary releases during Summer 1992, guiding the development
towards a shippable, publically available tool. The formal release of Tripwire occurred in December
of 1993.
Tripwire source is available at no cost.8 It has appeared in camp. sources. unix (volume 26)
on Usenet, and is available via anonymous FTPfrom many sites, including ftp.cs.purdue.edu
in pub/spaf!COAST!Tripwire. Those without Internet access can obtain information on obtaining
sources and patches via email by mailing to tripwire-request<Dcs. purdue. adu with the single
word "help" in the message body.
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